By Rudolf Richter
This choice of essays includes a few of Rudolf Richter’s very important contributions to investigate on New Institutional Economics (NIE). It bargains with the critical suggestion, ideas, and method of recent Institutional Economics and explores its relation to sociology and legislations. different chapters study purposes of NIE to numerous microeconomic and macroeconomic concerns within the face of uncertainty, from entrepreneurship to the euro crisis.
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Extra resources for Essays on New Institutional Economics
Formally, it deals with what we called the ‘invisible-hand’ approach to economic analysis. Lewis (1969) and Schotter (1981) are among the first representatives of this line of thought; later additions include the above mentioned work of Greif (1998b) and Aoki (2001). Central to this ‘equilibriumof-game’ view of institutions is the concept of the Nash equilibrium of a game: the state of a game, in which no actor has an incentive to deviate from his present plan of action as long as other actors do not do so.
1965). The logic of collective action: Public goods and the theory of groups. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Olson, M. (1982). The rise and decline of nations. New Haven: Yale University Press. Perrow, C. (1981). Markets, hierarchies, and hegemony. In A. H. van De Ven & W. J. ), Perspectives on organization design and behavior (pp. 371–386). New York, NY: Wiley. Perrow, C. (1986). Complex organizations. ). New York, NY: McGrawHill. Podolny, J. M. (1993). A status-based model of market competition.
The new institutionalism in political science. 53 In a general sense 49 Agassi (1975: 146) provides an excellent half-page description of the object of the controversy. See Fine and Milonakis (2003) and Milonakis and Fine (2005). 51 For a brief review and assessment of the criticisms of North’s NIEH see Zouboulakis (2005). 52 As opposed to Chap. 10 in Furubotn and Richter (2005). 53 Excellently outlined in North (2005). 50 3 Prospects of the NIE 21 these observations reach into a field of its own: evolutionary psychology (Barkow et al.