By Arthur J Tellis
This document examines the perspectives of India and Pakistan at the value ofPakistan_s foray into the Kargil-Dras quarter in a constrained conflict that has cometo be referred to as the Kargil clash. The objective of the research is to assessboth combatants_ perceptions of the quandary, so that it will comparing thepossibilities of destiny Kargil-like occasions and the consequences of thelessons each one state realized for balance in South Asia. The research isbased nearly completely on Indian and Pakistani resource materials.The Kargil drawback proven that even the presence of nuclear weaponsmight no longer substantially hose down protection pageant among the region_slargest states. despite the fact that, the query continues to be of even if the Kargilwar represents a foretaste of destiny episodes of tried nuclear coercionif India and Pakistan think that their nuclear features supply themthe immunity required to prosecute more than a few army operations brief ofall-out battle.
Read or Download Limited Conflict Under the Nuclear Umbrella : Indian and Pakistani Lessons from the Kargil Crisis (2001) PDF
Similar specific topics books
E-book through De Braganca, Aquino, Wallerstein, Immanuel Maurice
This document examines the perspectives of India and Pakistan at the importance ofPakistan_s foray into the Kargil-Dras area in a constrained warfare that has cometo be often called the Kargil clash. The target of the research is to assessboth combatants_ perceptions of the challenge, to be able to comparing thepossibilities of destiny Kargil-like occasions and the results of thelessons each one kingdom realized for balance in South Asia.
Thomas Sowell takes goal at various criminal, social, racial, academic, and monetary matters during this most up-to-date number of his debatable, by no means dull, regularly thought-provoking essays. From "gun keep an eye on myths" to "mealy mouth media" to "free lunch medicine," Sowell will get to the center of the issues all of us care approximately together with his commonly unsparing candor.
Additional info for Limited Conflict Under the Nuclear Umbrella : Indian and Pakistani Lessons from the Kargil Crisis (2001)
Raja Mohan, “China Unlikely to Adopt Anti-India Posture,” The Hindu, June 11, 1999. 34“Show Restraint: China,” The Pioneer, May 28, 1999; “Resume Talks, China Tells Sharif,” The Hindu, June 29, 1999; and “Kashmir Is Not Kosovo,” The Pioneer, May 30, 1999. 35 Arpit Rajain, “India’s Political and Diplomatic Response to the Kargil Crisis,” unpublished working paper, p. 8. See also “Kargil Infiltrators Are Fundamentalists: Russia,” The Hindustan Times, May 29, 1999; Vladimir Radyuhin, “Moscow Backs Operation Against Intruders,” The Hindu, May 28, 1999; “Assurance from Russia” [editorial], The Hindustan Times, May 30, 1999.
The next two sections explicate these various lessons learned by the two combatants. PAKISTAN’S PERSPECTIVE Premeditated Kargil-like Operations Are Not an Effective Means of Dispute Resolution, But Kargil Itself May Not Have Been an Unmitigated “Failure” Retired and uniformed military officers, the political leadership, foreign office bureaucrats, and opinion shapers and analysts widely agree that perhaps the most important lesson learned from Kargil is that such operations are not an effective means for advancing Pakistan’s strategic interests and hence are likely to be a less-thanattractive strategy in the policy-relevant future.
11 While this analysis cannot fully explicate why Pakistan was so confident, one possible reason is that Pakistan may have been emboldened by the sympathy that the United States expressed for Islamabad after India’s nuclear tests and Pakistan’s subsequently constrained response. Given Pakistan’s dubious assertions that Kargil was simply a mujahideen operation, the natural question arises as to whether Pakistan expected that the United States would not detect the presence of Pakistani regular forces in Kargil.